RFC 2945 (rfc2945) - Page 2 of 8
The SRP Authentication and Key Exchange System
Alternative Format: Original Text Document
RFC 2945 SRP Authentication & Key Exchange System September 2000 simple sniffing attacks, can be compromised by what is known as a "dictionary attack". This occurs when an attacker captures the messages exchanged during a legitimate run of the protocol and uses that information to verify a series of guessed passwords taken from a precompiled "dictionary" of common passwords. This works because users often choose simple, easy-to-remember passwords, which invariably are also easy to guess. Many existing mechanisms also require the password database on the host to be kept secret because the password P or some private hash h(P) is stored there and would compromise security if revealed. That approach often degenerates into "security through obscurity" and goes against the UNIX convention of keeping a "public" password file whose contents can be revealed without destroying system security. SRP meets the strictest requirements laid down in [RFC 1704] for a non-disclosing authentication protocol. It offers complete protection against both passive and active attacks, and accomplishes this efficiently using a single Diffie-Hellman-style round of computation, making it feasible to use in both interactive and non- interactive authentication for a wide range of Internet protocols. Since it retains its security when used with low-entropy passwords, it can be seamlessly integrated into existing user applications. 2. Conventions and Terminology The protocol described by this document is sometimes referred to as "SRP-3" for historical purposes. This particular protocol is described in [SRP] and is believed to have very good logical and cryptographic resistance to both eavesdropping and active attacks. This document does not attempt to describe SRP in the context of any particular Internet protocol; instead it describes an abstract protocol that can be easily fitted to a particular application. For example, the specific format of messages (including padding) is not specified. Those issues have been left to the protocol implementor to decide. The one implementation issue worth specifying here is the mapping between strings and integers. Internet protocols are byte-oriented, while SRP performs algebraic operations on its messages, so it is logical to define at least one method by which integers can be converted into a string of bytes and vice versa. An n-byte string S can be converted to an integer as follows: i = S[n-1] + 256 * S[n-2] + 256^2 * S[n-3] + ... + 256^(n-1) * S[0] Wu Standards Track
